In the spring of 1994 I visited a Chinese village
in Shandong Province, the guest of one of my students from Qingdao University
where I was teaching. On the first
evening of my visit, a group of prominent village men came to join me and my
host for dinner and, just as we sat down to eat, one of the men asked me, “Why
is America always attacking China?”
I was thrown for a loop by his question since all
my previous Chinese hosts and dinner guests had been routinely polite and
indirect. Besides, U.S.-China relations
didn’t seem particularly hostile at that time, so I was surprised to be plunged
into a conversation via an accusation of international aggression.
I don’t remember my precise answer, but, as well
as I can recall, I put together a broad explanation that probably churned out
phrases like “long-term common interests between China and the U.S.,” blah blah
blah, “shared interest in peaceful and mutually respectful relations,” yadda
yadda “occasional disagreements,” etc. You know: diplomacy talk.
But in a way I had been prepared for my feisty friend’s
accusation. By then I had spent half a
year teaching Chinese university students and learning from them as they learned
from me. One thing I definitely did
learn from them was that they did not trust the United States government and
they considered American criticism of China’s human rights record a morally
empty power play aimed at “keeping China down” (their words).
Lunch with Chinese Peasant Family (2008)
Chinese Village Ladies (2008)
Before I arrived in Qingdao, I had taken for
granted the idea that most Chinese appreciated American efforts to get the
Chinese government to allow more personal freedom to its citizens in the areas
of speech, religion and political activities.
After all, who doesn’t want more freedom?
My mistake was in thinking that the average
Chinese considered brave and tireless human rights advocates like Wei Jingsheng
to be patriotic heroes and the United States, in supporting such heroes, to be
a champion of the righteous and valiant “little guy.”
But no. Governmental
control over the media was such that most Chinese considered human rights
advocates to be troublemakers or even agents of foreign powers (like the U.S.)
whose real goal was to “keep China down.”
The argument of the average Chinese might have gone something like this:
“America has always tried to keep China weak so as to take advantage of us. Today, the so-called interest in ‘human
rights’ is just a cynical device to continue interfering in China’s affairs, and
undermine China’s growing strength.”
Of course, the more educated Chinese – university professors,
journalists, etc. – were more likely to sympathize with American human rights
policies as were those Chinese who lived in cities like Shanghai and Beijing
who had more contact with foreigners and, in the case of Beijing, had witnessed
firsthand the brutality of governmental repression during the 1989 Democracy
Movement. But these Chinese, sympathetic
to America’s pro-human rights policies, represented a very small minority of
China’s population.
Once I understood this, I shifted my own position. I had supported American economic pressure on
China in the name of human rights, but I decided that such efforts were futile
as long as most Chinese saw them as “anti-Chinese.” It seemed to me that it was important to
encourage as much interaction between ordinary Americans and ordinary Chinese
as possible over the long term with the idea that eventually more and more
Chinese would come to see how freedom of speech and the free press work in the
U.S. and would, of their own accord, begin to press for similar human rights in
large numbers. The heroic struggle of a
few brave individuals like Wei Jingsheng would turn into a tidal wave of
demands by thousands of knowledgeable Chinese, many of whom would have spent time
in countries where such freedoms are taken for granted.
Because of my change of mind, I took the time to
write a letter to Winston Lord, who was then Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, arguing that our government should make China’s
most-favored-nation status permanent, and not have it hinge on human rights
issues. This, I thought, would promote the
robust economic and intellectual exchange between China and America that would
help cultivate a generation of pro-human rights Chinese. I was glad when Congress and the Clinton
administration did grant permanent MFN status to China and, some years later,
when I had a chance to talk to Secretary Lord, he told me that a number of
letters like mine that came from people with experience in China were one
factor behind the administration’s switch to a pro-MFN policy.
Mr. Wei, in an op-ed in today’s New York
Times, argues that America did the wrong thing in delinking human rights from
the MFN issue. He believes that only by
applying constant economic pressure on the Chinese government could the United
States hope to see an improvement in the human rights situation in China.
While respecting Mr. Wei’s opinion, and, by the
way, admiring his extraordinary courage, I am going to disagree with him. I continue to believe, as I came to in 1994,
that China’s human rights policies will improve not by virtue of economic
pressure from the U.S. or other outsiders, but only by virtue of a widespread
transformation in the attitudes of the Chinese people themselves. And yes, I do see signs of such a
transformation taking place among those hundreds of Chinese with whom I have
talked and shared shots of baijiu over the past two decades.
Though the leaders of the Communist Party of
China, like political leaders everywhere, will not willingly give up the
absolute power they now wield, there are forces afoot that I don’t believe they
will be able to withstand in the long run.
First of all, every new generation of educated
Chinese is more liberal in its thinking than the one before it, and more aware
of how things are done in other countries.
The essential benefits of a more transparent governing structure and a
more independent press are becoming increasingly obvious – and pressure from
the United States is not the reason for this Chinese awakening.
Secondly, young Chinese are, above all,
patriotic. They want to see their country
grow prosperous and influential, taking its place among the leading nations of
the world. And so it should. But, if it continues to be ruled by a
secretive inner core of self-serving cadres who resort to terrorism against
individuals like Chen Guangcheng to maintain their authority, it faces a real
danger. China, as it takes its prominent
place on the world stage is in danger of looking like a rough-mannered thug in
an otherwise civilized gathering, a prospect that is best expressed in that old
Chinese phrase diulian or loss of
face. I don’t believe the bright young
Chinese that I meet every day would feel comfortable at the prospect of this unflattering
contrast.
Finally, the 100th anniversary of the
May Fourth Movement of 1919 is on the horizon.
This movement, launched by idealistic young Chinese was aimed ultimately
at bringing about a modern, democratic society for China. Many of the May Fourth Movement’s goals have
been achieved, but in the realm of democracy, the final goal remains elusive,
as all the world knows, and more and more Chinese are coming to know every
year.
What if the hard reality of economic pressure from
the U.S. was not the answer to China’s lack of human rights? What if the upcoming generation of Chinese
decided on their own to bring about the change that their great grandparents
dreamed of back in 1919? This may seem
like nothing more than a dream, but I suggest we be like Martin Luther King and
not underestimate the power of an inspiring dream. I’m with Leonard Cohen who wrote these
memorable lines:
The
dreamers ride against the men of action,
Oh,
see the men of action falling back.
I do have a dream, and I believe an ever-growing
number of young Chinese in countries and communities around the world share it.
As May 4, 2019, approaches, the power of
this dream can only grow. The world will
tremble when the millennial generation of Chinese fulfills the promise of this
dream, and I believe the world will be a better place for having been so deeply
shaken.